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Abstract
This Note argues that the Third Circuit’s definition for unpermitted national origin discrimina-
tion best balances the purposes of the FCN Treaty and Title VII, and that U.S. courts should focus
on factors such as visa status and differential treatment of executives in applying this definition.
Part I discusses the interaction of the FCN Treaty with Title VII. Additionally, Part I focuses on
the prevailing doctrine articulated by U.S. circuit courts that the FCN Treaty’s “of their choice”
provision grants a right to discriminate only on the basis of citizenship, not on the basis of national
origin. Part II analyzes the conflicting attempts by U.S. circuit courts to define the scope of na-
tional origin discrimination not protected by the FCN Treaty. Part III argues that the Third Circuit
has developed the best definition for national origin discrimination and discusses factors that U.S.
courts should consider in applying this definition. This Note concludes that U.S. courts evaluating
Title VII claims against Japanese companies must focus on the circumstances surrounding em-
ployment decisions as well as the companies’ decision-making processes in order to effectuate the
purposes of the FCN Treaty and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
DEFINING DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
NATIONAL ORIGIN UNDER ARTICLE VIII(l)
OF THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN
INTRODUCTION
Article VIII(l) of the United States-Japan Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN Treaty")' per-
mits Japanese companies in the United States to hire and fire
executives "of their choice."2 This provision often conflicts
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),
which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin.3 Under the prevailing doctrine articulated by
U.S. circuit courts, Article VIII(l) allows Japanese companies
to discriminate on the basis of citizenship, but does not permit
discrimination on the basis of national origin.4
1. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063 [hereinafter FCN Treaty].
2. Id. art. VIII(1). Article VIII(l) provides in part that "companies of either
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, account-
ants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other
specialists of their choice." Id. The treaty allows both parties to "engage" executives
of their choice in the territories of the other party, but only comes into conflict with
Title VII when Japanese companies rely on Article VIII(I) as a justification for dis-
criminatory practices. Id.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-2(a)) (1988) [hereinafter Title
VII]. Title VII provides that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employ-
ees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-2(a) (1988).
4. Compare Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
citizenship discrimination is permitted under FCN Treaty while discrimination on
basis of national origin is impermissible) and MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863
F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that Article VIII(l) of U.S.-Korea FCN Treaty
permits discrimination on basis of citizenship, not national origin), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989) and Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that discrimination on basis of citizenship by non-U.S. companies is permissible
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A problem arises in cases involving Japanese companies,
however, because of the high correlation between national ori-
gin and citizenship in Japan. Usually, companies violate Title
VII's prohibition against national origin discrimination, re-
gardless of their intent, if their employment policies have a dis-
criminatory effect with regard to national origin.5 Intent to
discriminate on the basis of national origin generally is not a
prerequisite for finding that a company violates Title VII if the
effect of employment policies leads to a statistical disparity in
the national origins of a company's employees.6
The homogeneity of Japanese society, however, ensures
that employment policies of Japanese companies that engage
in citizenship discrimination permitted under the FCN Treaty
will always create what appears to be a discriminatory effect in
U.S. subsidiaries.7 A finding of Title VII liability on the basis
of this discriminatory effect would violate a Japanese com-
pany's FCN Treaty rights. U.S. circuit courts, therefore, gen-
erally agree that Japanese companies are not liable under Title
VII for discriminatory effects, if such effects result from per-
mitted citizenship discrimination.8 However, because it is diffi-
under FCN Treaty) and Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that Article VIII(l) only permits discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin when hired employee possesses bona fide occupational characteristics),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) with Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc,
643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the FCN Treaty grants Japanese compa-
nies an absoulte right to discriminate in favor of their own citizens, because "of their
choice" language cannot be reconciled with anti-discrimination laws and treaty su-
persedes Title VII), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982). Congress defines
national origin as the country from which a person comes or the country from which
such person's forbears came. See 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1963); see also Mack A. Player, Citizenship, Alienage, and Ethnic
Origin Discrimination in Employment Under the Law of the United States, 20 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 29, 38-39 (1990) (discussing definition of national origin).
5. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (holding that discrimi-
natory purpose or effect constitutes national origin discrimination).
6. See id.; see also MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
7. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48. Japanese society is homogeneous because
99 percent ofJapanese citizens are ofJapanese national origin. See Brief for Respon-
dents and Cross Petitioners at 124-25, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457
U.S. 176 (1982) (No. 80-2070, No. 81-24); see also Matthew Orebic,Japanese Companies
on United States Soil. Treaty Privileges vs. Title VII Restraints, 9 HASTINGS INr'L & COMP. L.
REV. 377, 382 (1986) (stating that 99 percent ofJapan's population are ofJapanese
national origin).
8. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391 (stating that citizenship discrimination is permit-
ted under FCN Treaty while discrimination on basis of national origin is not permit-
ted); see also MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147 (holding that Article VIII(l) of FCN Treaty
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cult to distinguish between citizenship and national origin dis-
crimination, courts disagree as to what constitutes unpermitted
national origin discrimination.9
Definitions of unpermitted national origin discrimination
under Article VIII(1) of the FCN Treaty range from extremely
narrow to moderate.' 0 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit suggests a narrow definition that renders it almost
impossible to find Japanese companies liable under Title VII. 11
In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Third
Circuits suggest moderate definitions that permit national ori-
gin discrimination only when prohibiting it would conflict with
FCN Treaty rights.' 2
This Note argues that the Third Circuit's definition for un-
permitted national origin discrimination best balances the pur-
poses of the FCN Treaty and Title VII, and that U.S. courts
should focus on factors such as visa status and differential
treatment of executives in applying this definition. Part I dis-
cusses the interaction of the FCN Treaty with Title VII. Addi-
tionally, Part I focuses on the prevailing doctrine articulated by
U.S. circuit courts that the FCN Treaty's "of their choice" pro-
vision grants a right to discriminate only on the basis of citi-
zenship, not on the basis of national origin. Part II analyzes
the conflicting attempts by U.S. circuit courts to define the
scope of national origin discrimination not protected by the
permits discrimination on basis of citizenship, not national origin); Wickes, 745 F.2d
at 369 (holding that discrimination on basis of citizenship by non-U.S. companies is
permissible under FCN Treaty).
9. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988) (not-
ing difficulty in distinguishing national origin and citizenship caused by homogeneity
of Korean society), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); see also Brief for Respondents and
Cross Petitioners at 124-25, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24).
10. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48 (holding that unpermitted national ori-
gin discrimination must be defined moderately to effectuate the purposes of Treaty
and Title VII); Wickes, 745 F.2d at 363 (holding that national origin discrimination
only permitted when national origin and citizenship are synonomous); Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding Japanese company
liable under Title VII unless employee possesses bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) Inc,
643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that all national origin discrimination is per-
mitted by FCN Treaty), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
11. Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 552.
12. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147; Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363,
369 (6th Cir. 1984).
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FCN Treaty. Part III argues that the Third Circuit has devel-
oped the best definition for national origin discrimination and
discusses factors that U.S. courts should consider in applying
this definition. This Note concludes that U.S. courts evaluat-
ing Title VII claims against Japanese companies must focus on
the circumstances surrounding employment decisions as well
as the companies' decision-making processes in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the FCN Treaty and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.
I. ARTICLE VIII(1) OF THE FCN TREATY ALLOWS
JAPANESE COMPANIES TO DISCRIMINATE ON
THE BASIS OF CITIZENSHIP, BUT NOT
ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL
ORIGIN
Since 1981, U.S. federal courts have debated the scope of
the protection afforded to Japanese companies under the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Japan. 3 Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty
allows Japanese companies in the United States to "engage ex-
ecutives of their choice" in managing operations in the United
States. 4 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on the other hand,
limits employers' freedom of choice by proscribing discrimina-
tion on the basis of national origin. '5 A majority of U.S. circuit
courts have held that FCN Treaties protect non-U.S. compa-
nies from Title VII liability for discrimination on the basis of
citizenship, but not on the basis of national origin.16 There-
13. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d (6th Cir. 1984); Avigliano
v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457
U.S. 176 (1982); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) Inc, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
14. See FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII(l); see also Jerry Choe, Comment, For-
tino v. Quasar Co.: The Availability of a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty Defense
for the United States Subsidiary of a Japanese Parent Corporation, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
1130 (1992) (discussing whether "to engage" provision allows Japanese companies
to "have" or to "assign" executives of their choice managing their U.S. subsidiaries).
Language similar to the "of their choice" provision appears in almost every commer-
cial treaty between the United States and foreign governments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(1988 & 1992 Supp.) which lists at least 25 other treaties that contain the "of their
choice" provision.
15. Title VII, supra note 3 at §§ 2000e-e(2)(a).
16. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara, 863
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fore, the type of discrimination permitted under Article VIII(I)
is no longer an issue of contention among U.S. circuits.' 7
A. Article VIII(1) of The FCN Treaty
The purpose of the FCN Treaty is to encourage mutually
beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the
United States and Japan.' As one means of achieving this
purpose, the FCN Treaty assures Japanese corporations con-
ducting business in the United States that they will receive the
same treatment as U.S. companies.'" The FCN Treaty defines
this equal treatment as "national treatment. '"20
Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty provides that both par-
ties have a right to engage executives "of their choice."'" U.S.
negotiators, seeking security to manage overseas business in
the face of anticipated anti-U.S. sentiment, insisted on the in-
sertion of this language into the FCN Treaty.22 The "of their
F.2d 1135; Wickes, 745 F.2d 363; Avighano, 638 F.2d at 559 (stating that Japanese
companies are not exempt from Title ViI's prohibition against national origin dis-
crimination). But see Spiess, 643 F. 2d 353 (holding that FCN Treaty exempts Japanese
companies from all U.S. employment discrimination laws concerning national origin
discrimination).
17. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391; MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48; Wickes, 745
F.2d at 363. In fact, in the two most recent cases concerning Article VIII(l) of the
FCN Treaty and Title VII, defendants conceded that only discrimination on the basis
of citizenship is permitted under the Treaty. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Cross
Appellee at 15-16, 22-23, Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (Nos.
91-1123, 91-1197, 91-1564). While the question concerning which types of discrimi-
nation are permitted under the Treaty is settled, the scope of this protection is un-
clear. See infra notes 71-109 and accompanying text (discussing different ways that
courts have attempted to define unpermitted national origin discrimination).
18. See Hearing on Commercial Treaties Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1953) [hereinafer 1953 Hearing]; see also
Jonathan B. Schwartz, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of
Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 949-50 (1979).
19. See FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXII, 1 (defining "national treatment");
see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982) (noting
that national treatment entitles Japanese companies to same rights as U.S. companies
and subjects Japanese companies to same responsibilities as U.S. companies).
20. See FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXII, 1. Article XXII, 1 of the FCN
Treaty defines national treatment as "treatment accorded within the territories of a
Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situa-
tions, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be,
of such Party." Id. The Supreme Court clarified this definition noting that "[in
short, national treatment of corporations means equal treatment with domestic cor-
porations." Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 188 n.18.
21. See FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII(l).
22. See 1953 Hearing, supra note 18, at 2-3. see also Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181 n.6;
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choice" clause acts as a means of permitting U.S. companies to
hire key U.S. personnel in Japan without legal interference
from local laws that discriminate against aliens.23 The clause
also acts as a means for Japanese companies to engage Japa-
nese citizens as managerial personnel in the United States. 4
Pursuant to the FCN Treaty, Japanese citizens, chosen to be
executives by Japanese companies under Article VIII(l), may
obtain special visas known as E-visas which allow them to work
in the United States.25
If interpreted broadly, the phrase "of their choice" con-
fers rights that transcend national treatment, because Japanese
companies would be wholly exempt from laws to which U.S.
companies are subject. 6 Indeed, to define "of their choice" in
its broadest manner would grant Japanese companies an abso-
lute right to choose executives in the United States, thus ex-
tending to both the Japanese parent, and possibly its U.S. sub-
sidiary, 7 immunity from U.S. employment discrimination
laws. 8
see Thomas A. Coulter, Testing the United States' Commitment to International Law: The
Conflict Between Title VII and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 25 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 287, 300 (1990) ("of their choice" provision inserted to protect U.S.
businesses outside of United States). Many countries involved in FCN Treaty negoti-
ations opposed insertion of the "of their choice" provision because they saw it as
bestowing significant advantages to U.S. overseas ventures. Coulter, supra, at 300
n. 168.
23. See Herman Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
50 AM. J. INr'L L. 373, 386 (1956) (articulating reasons for Article VIII(l)); see also
Herman Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present
United States Practice, 5 AM J. COMP. L. 229, 234 (1956) (discussing purposes of
Treaty).
24. See FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII(l); see also Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950
F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that citizenship discrimination is protected by
FCN Treaty).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(E) (1988 & 1992 Supp.). The State Department
only grants E-visas pursuant to the terms of the FCN Treaty. Id. An E-visa holder is
"an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the provisions
of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the foreign
state of which he is a national." 21 C.F.R. §§ 41.40, 41.41 (1990).
26. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 951.
27. This note does not concern itself with the issue of whether ajapanese sub-
sidiary may assert its parent's FCN Treaty rights. For a discussion of this issue, see
Choe, supra, note 14.
28. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding that
wholly owned subsidiaries of Japanese corporations in United States cannot assert
treaty protection meant for their parent company because these subsidiaries are in-
corporated in United States, not "companies of Japan").
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The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts
must construe treaties broadly and liberally, 9 stressing that a
broad construction of treaty rights by U.S. courts encourages a
broad allocation of treaty rights to U.S. companies doing busi-
ness outside the United States.3 ' The Supreme Court has
firmly established that when a treaty and a subsequent statute
conflict, the statute neither abrogates nor modifies the treaty
unless Congress has clearly expressed such purpose.3 ' It is an
accepted principle of treaty construction, however, that U.S.
courts will not intentionally construe a treaty in a manner in-
consistent with a subsequent federal statute. 2 Title VII does
not contain any language specifically aimed at modifying the
FCN Treaty, but a broad construction of the FCN Treaty con-
flicts with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because such a construc-
tion allows Japanese companies to discriminate on the basis of
national origin.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employ-
ers from making employment decisions on the basis of an em-
ployee's national origin." Generally, national origin refers to
ancestry or the country from which a person's ancestors
came. 34 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an employer
violates Title VII when its employment practices have a dis-
criminatory purpose or effect.3 5
29. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). The Court held that "treaties
are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are
possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other
favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred." Id. at 342; see Bacardi Corp. v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
30. See Asakura, 265 U.S. at 342.
31. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (holding that statutes
only preempt treaty rights if congressional intent to do so is clear); see also McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
32. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (holding that courts will not
undertake to construe treaty in manner inconsistent with subsequent federal statute).
33. See Title VII, supra note 2, §§ 2000e-2000e-2(a). Title VII allows discrimina-
tion on the basis of national origin if the employer involved can prove that its deci-
sions were based on the necessity of employees possessing bona fide occupational
qualities. Id.
34. 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 87
(1963).
35. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,95 (1973) (holding that discrim-
inatory purpose or effect on basis of national origin violates Title VII).
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The U.S. Congress originally enacted Title VII to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices that create racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.3 6 The
Supreme Court has subsequently recognized that Title VII
protects U.S. citizens and resident aliens employed in the
United States.37 Although the statute prohibits discrimination
on the basis of national origin, it contains an exception that
allows companies to engage in national origin discrimination if
their decisions are based on bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions ("BFOQ').38 Under this BFOQ exception, a company
may employ workers on the basis of national origin in posi-
tions for which knowledge and skills that only these employees
possess are reasonably necessary to the successful operation of
its business. 9 U.S. courts applying the BFOQexception must
determine whether employees hired on the basis of national
origin possess characteristics which aggrieved employees do
not possess.4 ° Characteristics articulated as possibly essential
to the successful operation of a company include language
skills, knowledge of the parent company's culture and markets,
and an understanding of that culture's unique business prac-
36. See McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (noting
that Congress enacted Title VII to eliminate discrimination against minorities). The
legislative history of Title VII indicates that the statute was aimed at improving con-
ditions faced by minorities in the workplace. 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964).
37. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973). The Court stated
that it "agree[d] that aliens are protected from discrimination under the Act." Id.
The Supreme Court derived support for this proposition from Title VII which uses
the term "any individual" and also from the exemption in § 702 which provides that
Title VII "shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any state." Id. at 95 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l). The Court reasoned that
this statement implies that Title VII "was clearly intended to apply with respect to the
employment of aliens inside any state." Id.
38. See Title VII, supra note 3, § 2000 e-2(e). Title VII states that "it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees on
the basis of national origin in those certain instances where national origin is a bo-
nafide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise." Id. § 703(e).
39. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
40. Id. These factors include the Japanese national's language skills and his
knowledge of Japanese culture, products, markets, customs, and business practices.
Id. at 559. The court also suggested that courts must look at the Japanese national's
familiarity with the workings of the parent enterprise in Japan and acceptibility, to
those with whom the company does business. Id.
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
tices. 4l
C. The Citizenship-National Origin Distinction in Case Law
When employers engage in national origin discrimination
that is not encompassed by the BFOQ exception, they often
will assert Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty as a defense to
Title VII claims. The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed whether Article VIII(l) insulates companies headquar-
tered in homogeneous countries from Title VII liability.4" A
majority of U.S. circuit courts, however, have held that the
FCN Treaty does not fully insulate Japanese companies from
Title VII.43 In fact, only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has held that Article VIII(I) exempts non-U.S. corpora-
tions from U.S. employment laws proscribing national origin
discrimination.4
1. Supreme Court Precedent
In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. ,4' the U.S. Supreme
Court distinguished between discrimination on the basis of cit-
izenship and discrimination on the basis of national origin.
Considering a Title VII claim brought against a U.S. employer
by Mexican citizens, the Court held that Title VII does not
make it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship.
46
The Court reasoned that because "national origin" refers to
the country from which a person's ancestors came, citizenship
in a country, in itself, is not synonymous with national origin.4 7
The Court further stated, however, that Title VII prohibits dis-
41. Id.
42. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
43. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara v. Ko-
rean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Wickes
v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
44. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982). The Fifth Circuit held that Article VIII's "of their
choice" language could not be reconciled with employment laws prohibiting national
origin discrimination. Id. Because treaty obligations prevail in a conflict with domes-
tic legislation, the Fifth Circuit held that the FCN Treaty fully insulates Japanese
companies from U.S. employment laws prohibiting national origin discrimination.
Id.
45. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
46. Id. at 89-90.
47. Id. at 88.
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crimination on the basis of citizenship whenever the purpose
or effect of the actions is to discriminate on the basis of na-
tional origin.48 Although this distinction remains firmly
rooted, the boundaries between citizenship and national origin
are blurred in cases concerning companies headquartered in
countries with homogeneous populations.
In Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered a Title VII claim against a subsidiary of a
Japanese company.49 The Court, however, did not consider
the types of discrimination permitted under Article VIII(1) of
the FCN Treaty because this issue was not included in the
questions presented to the Court on appeal.5 0 The Supreme
Court's analysis, however, strongly suggests that Article
VIII(l) is not intended to confer an immunity on non-U.S.
companies from U.S. laws.5' In dictum, the Court stated that
the FCN Treaty is only intended to assure that Japanese com-
panies have the right to conduct business in the United States
exempt from claims of discrimination on the basis of alien-
age.52
2. U.S. Circuit Court Precedent
Although the Supreme Court's language in Sumitomo was
48. Id.
49. 457 U.S. 176 (1982). The Court, in Sumitomo, focused on whether a subsidi-
ary incorporated in the United States could assert its parent's FCN Treaty rights. Id.
The Court held that U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies, incorporated in the
United States, could not assert FCN Treaty rights as a defense to Title VII claims as
these subsidiaries are not Japanese companies. Id. at 189-90. The Supreme Court
"expressed no view," however, on whether a subsidiary could invoke any Article
VIII(I) rights of its Japanese parent. See id. The only circuit court to consider the
issue since Sumitomo is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which held
that when a Japanese parent company dictates a subsidiary's discriminatory conduct,
the subsidiary can assert its parent's Treaty rights. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950
F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Choe, Comment, supra note 14, at 1144 (discussing
subsidiary right to assert parent's treaty rights).
50. Id. at 180.
51. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 n.4. The Supreme Court did not consider the
issue of the scope of the "of their choice" provision and Title VII because the issue
was "not included in the questions certified for interlocutory review by the Court of
Appeals and was not set forth or fairly included in the questions presented for review
by [the Supreme] Court." Id. However, in dictum, the Court noted that "the pur-
pose of the treaties was not to give foreign corporations greater rights than domestic
companies, but instead to assure them the right to conduct business on an equal
basis without suffering discrimination based on their alienage." See id. at 187-88.
52. Id at 187-88.
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merely dictum, U.S. circuit courts considering Title VII claims
against companies headquartered in countries protected by
"of their choice" language have uniformly concurred in the
Court's reasoning that the FCN Treaty permits discrimination
on the basis of citizenship but not on the basis of national ori-
gin. While the Fifth Circuit continues to view the FCN
Treaty and Title VII as irreconcilable, it has not addressed the
question of the scope of Article VIII(l) since the Supreme
Court's decision in Sumitomo.54 The other three circuits ad-
dressing the issue have attempted to harmonize the competing
documents by focusing on the purposes of both.55
In Wickes v. Olympic Airways, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that the "of their choice" provision of an
FCN Treaty between Greece and the United States does not
provide a blanket immunity from U.S. employment laws.56
The Sixth Circuit further stated that FCN Treaties entitle non-
U.S. companies to discriminate on the basis of citizenship. 7
The court then held that non-U.S. companies enjoy an abso-
lute right to discriminate on the basis of national origin only
when they can show that citizenship discrimination and na-
53. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); see also Fortino v. Quasar
Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363
(6th Cir. 1984); Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
54. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982). Some academics argue that the Second Circuit
also found that the FCN Treaty and the statute are irreconcilable as it held that the
only way to give effect to both documents was to rely on the Bona fide Occupational
Qualification [hereinafter BFOQJ exception in Title VII. See Avigliano, 638 F.2d at
559. However, reliance on these exceptions allowed the court to reconcile what it
saw as a conflict between the treaty and statute in order to effect the purposes of
both. Id.
55. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) MacNamara v. Ko-
rean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Wickes v.
Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d (6th Cir. 1984); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190 (1888) (noting that courts must attempt to harmonize competing documents by
attempting to achieve purposes of each). In Avigliano, the Second Circuit did not
need to balance the purposes of the FCN Treaty and Title VII as the BFOQ excep-
tion served as a means of avoiding the conflict between these competing legislative
pronouncements. See Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 559.
56. 745 F.2d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that Article VIII does not pro-
vide complete exemption from U.S. employment laws).
57. Id. at 365-69.
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tional origin discrimination are identical.58
The Third and Seventh Circuits affirmed this distinction
between protected discrimination on the basis of citizenship
and prohibited national origin discrimination.59 In MacNamara
v. Korean Airlines, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held that the U.S.-Korea FCN Treaty, which contains the
same language as the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, allows Korean
companies to discriminate only on the basis of citizenship.6 °
The Third Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Second Circuits
that the Treaty was not intended to provide non-U.S. busi-
nesses with a complete exemption from employment discrimi-
nation laws. 6'
The Third Circuit solved the problem caused by the high
correlation between citizenship and national origin in homoge-
neous countries by defining two types of national origin dis-
crimination--disparate impact discrimination and disparate
treatment discrimination.6 . Disparate impact discrimination
occurs when a company's employment practices have a dis-
criminatory effect, even if such effect is unintended. 63 Dispa-
rate treatment discrimination occurs when a company's em-
58. Id. at 368.
59. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara v. Ko-
rean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
60. 863 F.2d at 1147-48 (affirming the Sixth Circuit's articulation of an Article
VIII(l) distinction between citizenship and national origin discrimination). The
Third and Sixth Circuits used similar reasoning even though the companies involved
in each case are headquartered in different countries. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147;
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1984). The fact that Korean
Airlines is headquartered in Korea, as opposed to Olympic Airways which is head-
quartered in Greece, did not alter the Third Circuit's approach because the "of their
choice" provision caused analogous problems in both cases. Id.
61. Id. "Article VIII(l) was not intended to provide foreign business with shel-
ter from any law applicable to personnel decisions other than those that would logi-
cally or pragmatically conflict with the right to select one's own nationals as managers
because of their citizenship." Id. (emphasis in original).
62. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48. The Third Circuit took this distinction
from the Supreme Court's holding in Espinoza that anything having a discriminatory
purpose or effect violates Title VII. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
The circuit court then incorporated situations that the Sixth Circuit had articulated
where mere citizenship discrimination causes a disparate impact. Id. at 94. These
three cases highlight the evolutionary process of the Third Circuit's standard for de-
termining if employment policies constitute unpermitted national origin discrimina-
tion. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 493
U.S. 944 (1989); Wickes, 745 F.2d 363; Espinoza, 414 U.S. 86.
63. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147. Such an effect is shown via a statistical dispar-
ity of the national origins of employees working in the companies in question. Id.
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ployment practices stem from a discriminatory purpose.'
Generally, a company violates Title VII if its employment poli-
cies have a discriminatory effect or if these policies are
prompted by discriminatory purpose.65 Under the Third Cir-
cuit standard, however, disparate impact alone will not consti-
tute a violation of Title VII absent a showing of discriminatory
purpose.66
In Fortino v. Quasar Co. ,67 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit treated the citizenship-national origin distinc-
tion as an established legal principle. The court stated that the
FCN Treaty permits discrimination on the basis of citizenship,
but not national origin.68 The Seventh Circuit, however, chose
not to enter the debate concerning whether Title VII confers a
blanket immunity upon Japanese companies because it found
no evidence of discrimination by the Japanese parent "save for
what is implicit in wanting your own citizens to run your for-
eign subsidiary."69 However, in making its original statement
that "the treaty permits discrimination on the basis of citizen-
ship, not of national origin," the court inferred that a blanket
immunity from U.S. employment discrimination laws is impos-
sible.70 Although it impliedly answered the question concern-
ing the type of discrimination permitted by the FCN Treaty,
the Seventh Circuit left open the question of the scope of im-
64. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1147 (1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989).
65. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (stating that discrimi-
natory purpose or effect violates Title VII); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (noting that unintentional discriminatory impact violates
Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (stating that Title VII
extends to policies that are fair in form yet discriminatory in nature). Therefore,
"Title VII liability can be found where facially neutral employment practices have a
discriminatory effect or a disparate impact on protected groups without proof that
the employer adopted those practices with a discriminatory motive." MacNamara,
863 F.2d at 1148.
66. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
67. 950 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1991).
68. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1991). However, the
Court of Appeals later stated that because the facts before it did not constitute na-
tional origin discrimination, it did not have to "choose sides" on the issue of whether
Article VIII(l) conferred a blanket immunity against suits brought on the basis of
Title VII. Id.
69. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
70. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391-92.
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permissible national origin discrimination by failing to define
the situations in which Japanese companies violate Title VII.
II. U.S. CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE CONCERNING WHAT
CONSTITUTES NATIONAL ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION
U.S. circuit courts have had difficulty defining the conduct
that constitutes national origin discrimination in cases involv-
ing companies headquartered in homogeneous countries.7
These courts have utilized three methods to define unpermit-
ted national origin discrimination. The Fifth Circuit has held
that the FCN Treaty permits all types of national origin dis-
crimination. 72 The Second Circuit, taking a slightly more re-
strictive view of the FCN.Treaty, narrowly defined unpermitted
national origin discrimination by relying on a broad interpreta-
tion of the BFOQ exception to Title VII. 73  Most recently, the
Third Circuit has adopted a moderate standard which man-
dates that a court should impose liability on Japanese compa-
nies only when the plaintiff can prove disparate treatment. 4
A. The Fifth Circuit View: Japanese Companies Are Exempt From
U.S. Employment Discrimination Laws
In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc. , the Fifth Circuit held
71. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989); see also Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d (6th Cir. 1984). In
a "normal" Title VII case the court would find the company liable if the company's
practices have a discriminatory purpose or effect. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg., 414
U.S. 86, 88 (1973). However, Japanese companies will invariably make decisions that
create a discriminatory effect if they choose only Japanese citizens as executives, be-
cause those executives will also be of Japanese national origin. See MacNamara, 863
F.2d at 1147. If a Japanese company exercises a preference for Japanese Americans
over other United States citizens, this is prima facie evidence of a Title VII violation.
See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1991). However, usually the
issue before courts involves companies where Japanese American executives are not
involved.
72. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc, 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
73. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). This burden is easy to satisfy because it
suggests a relaxed interpretation of the already broadly phrased BFOQ factors. Id. at
559.
74. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
75. 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit stated that "the right of
Japanese companies to choose essential personnel is a right to maintain Japanese
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that Article VIII(1) of the FCN Treaty shields Japanese compa-
nies making management personnel decisions from U.S. liabil-
ity for violations of employment laws proscribing national ori-
gin discrimination.76 The Fifth Circuit stressed that Title VI's
ban on national origin discrimination contradicts a Japanese
company's Article VIII right to choose its own executives. 7
To resolve this conflict, the Fifth Circuit held that even though
the Civil Rights Act was enacted after the FCN Treaty, no evi-
dence exists to suggest that Congress intended that the Civil
Rights Act would preempt the FCN Treaty. 78 The court,
control of overseas investment. To make the right subject to Title VII . . . would
render its inclusion in the treaty virtually meaningless." Id.
76. The Fifth Circuit held that the "[airticle VIII(l) 'of their choice' provision
allows Japanes companies to discriminate in favor of their citizens." Id. at 362. The
court also stated that treaty obligations prevail over Title VII when the two conflict.
Id. at 361. The court then noted that its holding applies in the context of situations
involving national origin discrimination. Id. at 362 n.8. This creates a problem be-
cause while the court speaks of a right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship, its
analysis appears to be tailored to granting an absolute right to discriminate on the
basis of national origin. Id.
This problem exists because the Fifth Circuit made no attempt to distinguish
citizenship from national origin. In fact, it used the terms interchangeably in its opin-
ion. Compare id at 363 (stating that holding conferred right to choose citizens) with id.
at 363 n.8 (noting that holding can be used to apply in the context of national origin
discrimination). In MacNamara, the Third Circuit interpreted the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing to "fully . . . insulate [a] company from domestic anti-discrimination laws with
respect to the hiring of executives." 863 F.2d 1135, 1139 (3d Cir. 1988). This view
is consistent with that expressed by the dissent in Spiess, which notes that "the major-
ity opinion concludes that C. Itoh-America is exempt from the requirements of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Spiess, 643 F.2d at 363 (Reavley,J., dissenting).
These two statements evidence the strong trend to interpret the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing as granting Japanese employers a right to discriminate in favor of their own na-
tionals without the impediment of U.S. laws that proscribe discrimination on the ba-
sis of national origin. See Gerald D. Silver, Note, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaties and United States Discrimination Law: The Right of Branches of Foreign Companies to
Hire Executives "Of Their Choice", 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 765, 772 (1989) (discussing
exemption granted by Fifth Circuit); see also MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1139.
77. 643 F.2d at 362.
78. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc, 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982). In Whitney v. Robertson, the Supreme
Court held that when a treaty and statute are inconsistent, the one last in date con-
trols provided that the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing. 124
U.S. 190 (1888). The Fifth Circuit looked to McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 1021 (1963), in which the Supreme Court held that
subsequent federal legislation will invalidate treaty obligations if the congressional
intent to do so is clearly expressed. However, without this clear expression, the
Spiess court "decline[d] to abrogate the American government's solemn undertaking
with respect to a foreign national." Spiess, 643 F.2d at 362.
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therefore, held that it could not undermine the FCN Treaty
without a legislative pronouncement.79 Finally, the court
stated that if the signatories of the FCN Treaty intended the
"of their choice" provision to be limited, the FCN Treaty lan-
guage would have been tailored to effectuate that purpose.8 0
B. The Second Circuit View: Japanese Companies Have Little
Title VII Liability
The Second Circuit, taking a slightly less absolute view of
the FCN Treaty, framed a narrow definition of national origin
discrimination that makes it almost impossible to hold Japa-
nese companies liable under Title VII. a ' In Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji Am. Inc., the Second Circuit held that the only
way to reconcile the FCN Treaty and the Civil Rights Act was
to rely on a broad construction of the BFOQexception to Title
VII. s2 Under this exception, a company may employ workers
on the basis of national origin "in positions where such em-
ployment is reasonably necessary to the successful operation of
its business. ' 3  Courts applying this BFOQ exception must
examine the qualifications of employees hired on the basis of
national origin as compared to the employees whose jobs they
are taking.84 To ensure that its employment decision receives
BFOQstatus, a company usually must provide evidence of em-
ployee characteristics that satisfies a narrow interpretation of
the factors set out in the statute.8 5 Although courts usually
construe the BFOQ exception narrowly, the Second Circuit
79. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 362.
80. Id.
81. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
82. Id. at 559.
83. Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 559.
84. Id. These factors include the Japanese national's language skills and his
knowledge of Japanese culture, products, markets, customs and business practices.
The court also suggested that courts must look at the Japanese national's familiarity
with the workings of the parent enterprise in Japan and acceptibility to those with
whom the company does business. See id. at 559; see also Title VII, supra note 3 (artic-
ulating BFOQ exception).
85. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). "The BFOQexception of Title VII is to
be construed narrowly in the normal context." See id.; see also Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (stating that narrow construction of BFOQfactors must be
used in "normal" cases).
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held that it must be construed broadly in cases involving com-
panies headquartered in countries that are signatories of trea-
ties containing the "of their choice" provision.86 The Second
Circuit noted that a broad interpretation was a means of avoid-
ing the imposition of an undue burden on Japanese employ-
ers.
8 7
C. The Sixth and Third Circuit Views: A Moderate Definition Leads
To Some Liability For Japanese Companies Under Title VII
The moderate definition of conduct that constitutes un-
permitted national origin discrimination by Japanese compa-
nies has undergone an evolutionary process. First, the Sixth
Circuit held that Japanese companies do not violate Title VII if
these companies can show that citizenship and national origin
are synonymous. The Third Circuit relied on this reasoning in
holding that Japanese companies do not violate Title VII with-
out a showing of discriminatory motivation on the part of the
company.8 8
In Wickes v. Olympic Airways, the Sixth Circuit examined a
commercial treaty with Greece containing the "of their choice"
provision.89 In Wickes, plaintiffs brought suit under Michigan
anti-discrimination laws alleging that Olympic Airways en-
gaged in discriminatory employment practices. 90 Finding that
the treaty in question did not conflict with Michigan law, the
court saw no reason to invoke something akin to Title VII's
BFOQ exception. 9' Instead, the court held that because citi-
86. Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 559. The court stated that "as applied to a Japanese
company enjoying rights under Article VIII of the Treaty it must be construed in a
manner that will give due weight to the Treaty rights and unique requirements of a
Japanese company doing business in the United States." Id. Language similar to the
"of their choice" provision appears in almost every commercial treaty between the
United States and foreign governments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 which lists at least 25
other treaties that contain the "of their choice" provision.
87. Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 559. As the BFOQexception is already quite broadly
phrased, an even broader interpretation with respect to companies protected by an
FCN Treaty is likely to provide a relatively relaxed burden of proof.
88. MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
89. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
90. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 364-65. Wickes was litigated in a federal court because of
an Age Discrimination in Employment Act [hereinafter ADEA] claim brought to-
gether with the claim under the Michigan anti-discrimination statute. Id.
91. Id.
11151991-19921
1116 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1099
zenship, in and of itself, is not a classification listed in Michi-
gan's statute, Olympic Airways could legitimately hire, pro-
mote or fire Greek nationals on account of their citizenship.9 2
The court further stated that if a non-U.S. company can show
that citizenship is equivalent to national origin, a finding of Ti-
tle VII liability on the basis of discriminatory effect would pre-
empt FCN Treaty rights. Therefore, to protect the FCN
Treaty rights of non-U.S. companies, the court held that the
U.S.-Greece FCN Treaty must prevail over anti-discrimination
laws in such cases.93 The Sixth Circuit failed to offer a means
of determining the conduct that constitutes national origin dis-
crimination when a defendant cannot prove that citizenship
and national origin are synonymous.94
In MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning and
defined unpermitted national origin discrimination in a man-
ner that would not infringe upon the rights guaranteed by the
FCN Treaty.95 The court recognized that citizenship discrimi-
nation and national origin discrimination sometimes are sy-
nonymous.96 In these instances, the court noted, the FCN
Treaty must prevail.97 The court held, however, that Article
VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty will not shield non-U.S. companies
that intentionally discriminate on the basis of national origin
from Title VII liability.98
In MacNamara, the Third Circuit held that a finding of na-
tional origin discrimination based solely on a theory of dispa-
rate impact cannot be reconciled with Article VIII(I) of the
92. Id.
93. Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1984). In Espinoza,
the Supreme Court distinguished citizenship discrimination from national origin dis-
crimination. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). However, in cases involv-
ing homogeneous countries the distinction between the two becomes blurred.
MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 944
(1988).
94. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368.
95. 863 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). MacNamara
concerned a U.S.-Korea Friendship Treaty with language identical to the U.S.-Japan
treaty. See id; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, MacNamara v.
Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1741).
96. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1147-48.
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FCN Treaty."9 The court noted that it should not find non-
U.S. companies liable for disparate impact when parent com-
panies merely intend to exercise their FCN Treaty right to en-
gage citizens of their own country as executives in their U.S.
subsidiaries.10 0
The Third Circuit holding arose from its recognition that
a problem results in a disparate impact case involving a non-
U.S. company headquartered in a homogeneous country where
citizenship and national origin are highly correlated.' 0 ' If a
non-U.S. company based in a homogeneous country wants to
control the company's U.S. subsidiary, the parent company will
invariably hire executives of the same national origin as the na-
tional origin of the parent company's management. 0 2 Regard-
less of the parent company's intent, this hiring decision ap-
pears to have a discriminatory effect and, therefore, violates
Title VII.' ° s To find the company in violation of Title VII
when the company makes decisions .on the basis of citizenship,
however, deprives these companies of their FCN Treaty rights.
The court held, therefore, that for employment decisions that
cause disparate impact, liability must not be imposed on non-
U.S. parent companies that want citizens of the homogeneous
country in which the parent company is located to run their
U.S. subsidiaries.'°4
The other type of national origin discrimination set forth
by the Third Circuit involves disparate treatment of employ-
ees. 0 5 Under the disparate treatment theory, a court must im-
pose liability on a non-U.S. company when the court affirma-
tively finds that the employer was not simply exercising its Ar-
ticle VIII(l) right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship.'0 6
To determine whether the employer was simply exercising its
Article VIII(l) treaty right, the court should utilize a substan-
tive standard that partially relies on statistical evidence show-
99. MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
100. Id. at 1147.
101. d. at 1147-48.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1147, 1148 (1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989).
105. Id. at 1148.
106. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
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ing disparate impact.' 0 7 Disparate impact alone, however, will
not suffice as proof of national origin discrimination. 0 s This
standard allows companies to utilize their Article VIII rights as
justification for the disparate impact of their hiring decisions,
thereby avoiding an incorrect finding that the company vio-
lated Title VII. In the same light, when a company cannot pro-
vide satisfactory reasons for disparate impact, the court must
find that the company violates Title VII.O9
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
MODERATE DEFINITION OF UNPERMITTED
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
The difficult issue now perplexing the courts concerns the
formulation of a definition of conduct that constitutes imper-
missible national origin discrimination in cases involving com-
panies headquartered in homogeneous countries. The Third
Circuit's moderate standard imposes Title VII liability on Japa-
nese companies only when the plaintiff can prove discrimina-
tory motives. "0 This moderate standard, while not impossible
to meet, protects FCN Treaty rights and furthers the purposes
of U.S. employment discrimination laws. The two other stan-
dards suggested by U.S. circuit courts are inadequate because
under each of these standards Japanese companies obtain a
broad right with which to circumvent U.S. employment laws in
their hiring decisions. The Fifth Circuit's standard contradicts
U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. federal circuit court precedent
by holding that the FCN Treaty permits all types of national
origin discrimination."' The Second Circuit's definition is
flawed as interpreting the already broad BFOQ exception even
more broadly makes it increasingly difficult for courts to en-
force Title VII against Japanese companies." 1
2
107. Id.
108. MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
109. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
110. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
Ill. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc, 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
112. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). This burden is easy to satisfy because it
suggests a relaxed interpretation of the already broadly phrased BFOQfactors. Id. at
559.
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A. The Third Circuit's Definition of Unpermitted National Origin
Discrimination Best Balances the Purposes of the FCN
Treaty and Title VII
1. An Overbroad Definition of Unpermitted National Origin
Discrimination Would Deprive Japanese Companies
of Their FCN Treaty Rights
Although no U.S. circuit court has suggested an extremely
broad definition of unpermitted national origin discrimination
by a Japanese company, one could argue that a broad reading
should be given to Title VII to further U.S. domestic policies.
Under such a definition, Japanese companies would be subject
to the "discriminatory purpose or effect" test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Espinoza.' 13 However, this extremely broad
definition of unpermitted national origin discrimination is
hardly ever raised because it is ineffective in cases involving
U.S. subsidiaries of parent companies in a homogeneous coun-
try. Finding a Japanese company liable for discriminatory ef-
fects, without showing that the company had a discriminatory
purpose, violates the FCN Treaty rights of the company be-
cause Japan's homogeneous society insures that choosing ex-
ecutives on the basis of citizenship will have a discriminatory
effect."i 4 Therefore, a broad definition of unpermitted na-
tional origin discrimination undermines the prevailing view
among U.S. federal appellate courts that the FCN Treaty au-
thorizes citizenship discrimination, because such an interpreta-
tion almost always leads to a finding of liability under Title
VII.'1 5
2. The Third Circuit's Definition of Unpermitted National
Origin Discrimination Effectuates the Purposes of
the FCN Treaty and Title VII
The Third Circuit's reliance on a distinction between dis-
113. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1973).
114. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); see also Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir.
1984).
115. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48. In these days of Japan bashing some
might prefer this result, but proponents of this view must remember that the rights
conferred and the interpretation of FCN treaties are reciprocal for American compa-
nies abroad. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, MacNamara v. Korean
Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1741).
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parate impact liability and disparate treatment liability pro-
vides the best proposed means of determining the conduct that
constitutes unpermitted national origin discrimination. " 6 The
Third Circuit defines unpermitted national origin discrimina-
tion as conduct that evinces disparate treatment.'" Under this
view, the FCN Treaty protects employment policies of Japa-
nese companies that produce discriminatory effects, in the ab-
sence of proof of disparate treatment.' t8  Discrimination on
the basis of citizenship presumably falls within the disparate
impact category unless aggrieved employees, or aggrieved for-
mer employees, can show that the company was motivated by
discriminatory purposes." 9 This approach effectively pre-
serves FCN Treaty rights but still enables plaintiffs to prove
that Japanese companies impermissibly discriminate on the ba-
sis of national origin. The Third Circuit, however, did not ar-
ticulate the factors which should be employed, along with em-
pirical evidence of disparate impact, to prove unpermitted na-
tional origin discrimination.' 20
B. The Second Circuit's Reliance on a Broad Application of the
BFOQ Factors Makes a Finding of Title VII Liability
Almost Impossible
In Avigliano, the Second Circuit suggested that the BFOQ
exception, which is normally construed narrowly, must be con-
strued in a broad manner to assure that courts give "due
weight" to FCN Treaty rights. 12  However, the scope of each
116. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48.
117. Id. Disparate treatment is another way of saying discriminatory motive or
purpose. Id. The Third Circuit's standard is not only applicable to Japan but instead
to all homogeneous countries as evidenced by the fact that MacNamara dealt with a
Korean company but relied on cases involving the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty. Id. at
1146-48.
118. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
119. MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989). This confers a greater right to discriminate on Japanese compa-
nies than their U.S. counterparts. U.S. companies can be found guilty of a Title VII
violation based solely on a showing of disparate impact. Id. at 1146-7. The United
States is such a heterogeneous culture that disparate impact does not necessarily flow
from citizenship discrimination. Thus, if every company were subject to the same
standards, U.S. companies woud have an advantage because these companies would
be less likely to be found in violation of Title VII.
120. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
121. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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factor in the list that the Second Circuit articulated to help de-
termine whether Japanese employment practices qualify under
the exception is already quite broad. 2 2 Interpreting these fac-
tors even more broadly makes it very easy for a Japanese com-
pany to argue that national origin is a bona fide occupational
quality because of the commonly held feeling in Japan that
only Japanese persons can understand Japanese customs and
business practices. 23  A relaxed burden of proof, arising from
a broad interpretation of the BFOQ factors, would undermine
the citizenship-national origin distinction by making it almost
impossible for a court to find that Japanese companies violate
Title VII.
C. The Fifth Circuit's Complete Exemption from U.S. Employment
Discrimination Laws for Japanese Companies Violates the
Purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964
The Fifth Circuit's absolute exemption of Japanese com-
panies from Title VII liability contravenes the prevailing doc-
trine among the U.S. circuit courts that the FCN Treaty only
permits discrimination on the basis of citizenship, not national
origin. | 2  The creation of this distinction between citizenship
discrimination and national origin discrimination implies that
situations must arise in which Japanese companies violate Title
VII. If the FCN Treaty was intended to confer a complete ex-
emption from U.S. employment laws, there would be no need
to distinguish between types of discrimination because compa-
nies would be exempt from Title VII liability regardless of the
type of discrimination involved.
122. Id. at 559. The factors listed by the Second Circuit are: "(1)Japanese lin-
guistic and cultural skills, (2)knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and
business practices, (3) familiarity with the personnel and working of the principal or
parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons with whom the
company or branch does business." Id.
123. See TIM ERNST & TOMMY UEMATSU, GAIJIN 9 (1987). Japanese commonly
tell foreigners who inquire about Japanese customs or society that foreigners are un-
able to understand such customs because they are not Japanese. Id. A variation of
this idea is sometimes advanced by Japanese companies as evidence of the necessity
of choosing persons ofJapanese national origin as executives. See Frontline (PBS Tel-
evision Broadcast, Feb. 18, 1992) (noting importance of Japanese nationality to em-
ployment practices of Japanese companies).
124. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara v.
Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
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U.S. Supreme Court precedent also counsels against the
Fifth Circuit's holding that the Treaty completely exempts Jap-
anese companies from Title VII's prohibition against national
origin discrimination. 125 The Supreme Court originally distin-
guished between citizenship discrimination and discrimination
on the basis of national origin in Espinoza. 12 6 Proponents of an
absolute exemption from Title VII for Japanese companies ar-
gue that the Espinoza distinction is not relevant in cases involv-
ing parent companies from homogeneous countries protected
by FCN treaties because the Court, in Espinoza, made its dis-
tinction on the basis of U.S. society where citizenship and na-
tional origin are easily distinguished.1 27  The Espinoza distinc-
tion, however, has been applied by the Third, Sixth and Sev-
enth Circuits to cases concerning parent companies located in
homogeneous countries. 2 The Third Circuit adopted the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Espinoza as evidence that courts
can distinguish discrimination on the basis of citizenship from
discrimination on the basis of national origin. 29
Another factor that counsels against a blanket immunity
from employment discrimination laws for Japanese companies
is the Supreme Court's statement in Sumitomo that the FCN
Treaty is only intended to assure that Japanese companies
have the right to conduct business in the United States exempt
125. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (noting
that FCN Treaty does not give Japanese companies an absolute exemption from Title
VII); see also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
126. 414 U.S. 86.
127. Brief for Respondents and Cross-Petitioners at 124-25, Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24). With a homoge-
nous society it is difficult to make this distinction, but in the United States citizens
come from so many different ancestral groups that a distinction is easily made. Id. In
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court upheld a company's right to discrimi-
nate on the basis of citizenship as a U.S. citizenship requirement will not eliminate
the possibility of a company made up of employees of a diversity of national origins.
414 U.S. at 95. However, a Japanese citizenship requirement creates an extraordi-
nary homogeneous work force. Id.
128. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); MacNamara v.
Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989);
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
129. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147. "Inherent in the [Supreme] Court's
reading of Title VII and its history, is a Congressional determination that a trier of
fact can distinguish national origin discrimination from citizenship discrimination
and, accordingly, that courts can impose liability on the basis of the former without
imposing it for the latter." Id.
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from claims of discrimination on the basis of alienage.15 0 The
Supreme Court also stated that the purpose of the Treaty is
not to give non-U.S. companies greater rights than domestic
companies.13' This language strongly suggests that the Treaty
was not meant to invalidate all Title VII claims.' 32
Others have argued that the Espinoza distinction cannot be
applied in cases involving non-Japanese employees' assertions
of discrimination against a Japanese company. 133 This argu-
ment hinges on Title VII's stated purpose of eliminating dis-
criminatory practices that create racially stratified job environ-
ments to the disadvantage of minority citizens, not to assure
non-Japanese of executive postitions in Japanese compa-
nies.'3 4  Proponents of this argument can assert that no stigma
attaches in U.S. society to being non-Japanese, and therefore
Title VII does not apply to this group. Although the U.S. Con-
gress enacted Title VII to solve problems experienced by mi-
norities, the Civil Rights Act can still protect a victimized mem-
ber of the majority. Title VII clearly protects individuals who
are subject to discrimination on the basis of national origin re-
gardless of their membership in a group that normally faces
persecution.
D. Factors That U.S. Courts Should Consider When Evaluating Title
VII Claims Against Japanese Companies
Although the Third Circuit's definition of unpermitted na-
tional origin discrimination best furthers the purposes of the
130. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 187-88.
131. Id.
132. See A. Ritomsky & R. Jarvis, Doing Business in America: Is This The Unfinished
Work of Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193, 215 (1986). The
authors argue that the Supreme Court language in Sumitomo supports the conclusion
that Article VIII(I) simply makes foreign employers subject to the same employment
discrimination laws that apply to American companies.
133. Reply Brief for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent at 47, Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24) "Respondent's
effort to remedy their employment grievances by invoking [Title VII] stretches it far
beyond what it can bear." Id. at 47. Petitioners also asserted that "the class of per-
sons allegedly discriminated against-persons residing in the United States who are
not Japanese treaty traders-is, by any measure, overly broad." Id. It is surely not
the kind of historically disadvantaged class of persons that Title VII was designed to
protect. Id.
134. See id. at 47; see also MacDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973) (stating that purpose of Congress in enacting Title VII was to eliminate dis-
crimination against minorities).
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FCN Treaty and Title VII, the Third Circuit failed to articulate
factors that courts should utilize, along with statistical evidence
of disparate impact, 3- to find that a Japanese company en-
gages in national origin discrimination. Courts should look at
the visa status of the employees involved, and focus on the dif-
ferential treatment of employees, along with statistical evi-
dence of disparate impact when examining situations where al-
leged Title VII violations exist.
1. E-visas
One factor that indicates whether differential treatment of
executives by a Japanese company results from discrimination
based on citizenship or national origin concerns the type of
visa that Japanese executives possess. Japanese executives
hired pursuant to the terms of the Treaty often receive E-visas
which enable them to work in the United States.1 36 E-visas are
only granted to those executives who qualify under Article
VIII(I) of the Treaty. 37 In Fortino, the employer argued that
differential treatment of Japanese managers by the subsidiary
flowed from the E-visa status of the managers. 3 8 Because the
FCN Treaty only permits citizenship discrimination, the sub-
sidiary noted, differential treatment of E-visa executives neces-
sarily arises from discrimination on the basis of citizenship, not
national origin. 3 9
In an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Seventh Circuit in
Fortino, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") disputed the argument that because Japanese exec-
utives possess E-visas, all decisions concerning them flow from
the FCN Treaty. 4 ° To support this contention, the EEOC
135. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1147 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
136. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(E) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
137. Id. An E-visa holder is defined as "an alien entitled to enter the United
States under and in pursuance of the provisions of a treaty of commerce and naviga-
tion between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
138. See Reply Brief of Defendant, Appellant, Cross Appellee Quasar Company
at 13, Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (No. 87-C4386).
139. Id.
140. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Plaintiff at 8, Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (Nos.
91-1123, 91-1197, 91-1564).
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noted that E-visas may be issued to a broader class of employ-
ees than those identified in Article VIII(I)."4 1 This argument
is predicated on the fact that E-visas may be obtained by em-
ployees of U.S. companies ifJapanese own more than fifty per-
cent of such companies. 42 This argument, however, is invalid
because Article VII of the FCN Treaty permits Japanese com-
panies to obtain majority interest in a U.S. company which it
may then "control and manage."'143 Article VIII(l) then allows
these companies to engage executives of their choice in the
United States. 144  Executives who obtain E-visas to work for
these subsidiaries do so under Article VIII(l) because more
than fifty percent ownership authorizes control by the majority
owner.
The State Department only grants E-visas pursuant to Ar-
ticle VIII(l). 45 Therefore, Japanese executives who possess
these visas enter the United States under the protection of the
FCN Treaty. 46 This correlation between E-visas and the FCN
Treaty suggests that any differential treatment of Japanese ex-
ecutives is based upon citizenship because the FCN Treaty
does not permit the issuance of E-visas for national origin pur-
poses. However, E-visa status ofJapanese executives does not
eliminate the possibility that these executives are employed by
U.S. subsidiaries motivated by a desire to discriminate on the
basis of national origin. Possession of E-visas by Japanese ex-
ecutives proves that Japanese employees obtained these visas
under the FCN Treaty, which only permits citizenship discrimi-
nation. However, no authority exists to support the notion
that acquisition of an E-visa by an executive ensures that the
141. Id at 6. "According to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (15)(E) (i) and the Department of State regulations promulgated under the
law, an alien may obtain an E-visa where his employer is '[a]n organization at least 50
percent owned by persons having the nationality of the treaty country' 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.51 (c) (2)." Id. at 6-7. The EEOC also asserted that E-visas do not confer rights
on companies, but this argument, while true, is weak because the Treaty confers the
Article VIII(l) rights that allow employees chosen on the basis of citizenship to ob-
tain E-visas. Id.
142. Id.
143. See FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art VII.
144. FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII(l).
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1988 & 1992 Supp.); see also 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.110-. 125 (1989) (outlining procedures for application for and issuance of non-
immigrant alien visas).
146. Id.
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Japanese company did not have a discriminatory motive when
it hired such executive. Courts should examine factors that re-
late to the terms of their employment in determining a com-
pany's motives in its executive employment decisions. Thus,
the mere fact that Japanese executives possess E-visas does not
automatically preclude a finding of unpermitted national ori-
gin discrimination.
2. Differential Treatment in Salaries and Evaluation
Techniques
The Seventh Circuit failed to address whether impermissi-
ble national origin discrimination should be defined broadly or
narrowly; nor did it examine the factors that courts should
consider with respect to Title VII claims against Japanese com-
panies. 147 Prior to being reversed by the Seventh Circuit, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, how-
ever, articulated several factors that courts should use to deter-
mine whether an employer has engaged in unpermitted na-
tional origin discrimination. 4 ' The district court held that the
U.S. subsidiary engaged in unpermitted national origin dis-
crimination by evaluating and paying managerial employees of
Japanese national origin on a different basis than the basis
used to evaluate managerial employees of U.S. national ori-
gin. 149 This disparity in salaries and evaluation techniques evi-
dences impermissable national origin discrimination because
salaries are not strongly related to a Japanese parent com-
pany's right to "engage" its own citizens to manage its U.S.
subsidiaries. Once the U.S. subsidiary employs these citizens
as executives, paying them more than other managers solely
147. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
148. Fortino v. Quasar, 751 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 950 F.2d 389
(7th Cir. 1991).
149. d. at 1315. The subsidiary justified plaintiff's discharge as arising out of
the necessity for Japanese speaking ability in specific managerial positions and out of
the company's dire financial condition. 751 F. Supp at 1315. The district court
found that the evidence presented contradicted this justification. Id. The district
court also noted that Quasar raised salaries ofJapanese managers while it maintained
the salary status quo for non-Japanese managers. Id. The court stated that "Quasar
significantly enhanced the financial renumeration received by its managerial employ-
ees of Japanese national origin at the very time that Quasar was adversely affecting
the employment of its managerial employees of American national origin." Id. at
1316.
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because they are Japanese is extremely strong evidence of na-
tional origin discrimination.
A view commonly expressed in Japanese society is that
foreigners are outsiders and that self-protection of Japanese
nationals is essential to the Japanese national spirit.150 Matsu-
shita, the parent company in Fortino, prides itself because in its
seventy years it has never laid off a Japanese employee.' 5 ' In
return for this type of lifetime employment, Japanese workers
are expected to remain loyal to their group and are expected
to focus inward on their fellow Japanese while living abroad. 1'5 2
This group mentality can be evidence of disparate treat-
ment where Japanese workers gain preferential treatment com-
pared with their non-Japanese colleagues. In Fortino, the dis-
trict court held that the subsidiary discriminated because it ex-
empted all executives of Japanese national origin from its
reorganization procedures.15 3 This policy could have been in-
terpreted in two ways. First, the subsidiary did not replace its
Japanese managers because it wanted Japanese citizens to con-
trol departments in which their expertise was necessary. This
would constitute permitted citizenship discrimination. How-
ever, if the subsidiary fired only its non-Japanese personnel,
replacing them with Japanese executives, its actions would
constitute unpermitted national origin discrimination unless
the Japanese executives possessed some necessary skill or
qualification that the non-Japanese managers did not pos-
sess.' 54  The only way to determine the basis on which the
Japanese company makes its decisions would be to compare
the workers replacing the responsibilities of the replaced man-
agers with the responsibilities of new executives. If the new
executives have the same duties as those employees that previ-
ously held their jobs, it is likely that the new workers were
hired on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII.
150. See Frontline (PBS Television Broadcast, Feb. 18, 1992); see also ERNST, supra
note 123, at 8.
151. ERNST, supra note 123, at 12. According to Shuichi Kato, one of Japan's
leading writers and social critics, "a Matsushita company had pioneered the system of
lifetime employment. It is proud that in its 70 years it has never laid off a Japanese
employee." Id.
152. Id.
153. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. 11. 1990), rev'd, 950
F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). Reorganization procedures included mass firings. Id.
154. See id. at 1316.
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3. Statistical Evidence
In MacNamara, the Third Circuit noted that statistical evi-
dence ordinarily used to support a claim of disparate impact
often resembles statistical evidence that is used to help estab-
lish disparate treatment.15 5 The court further stated that be-
cause a homogeneous country's population consists of the
same national origin, permitted citizenship discrimination is
likely to lead to a substantial statistical disparity between other-
wise qualified non-citizens of a particular national origin and
citizens of the country's national origin. A problem results if
this statistical disparity alone suffices as proof of a Title VII
violation.
Although the Third Circuit recognized that statistical evi-
dence of disparate impact alone could not be used to prove
that a company headquartered in a homogeneous country vio-
lates Title VII, the court did not forbid the use of statistics in
Title VII cases.' 56 The court noted that the likelihood of an
erroneous finding that an employer intentionally discriminates
on a basis other than citizenship is slight where an empirical
disparity is explainable on the basis of a company's exercise of
its Article VIII(l) rights. 57 Subsequently, in Bruno v. WB.
Saunders Co., the Third Circuit noted that the usefulness of sta-
tistics in discrimination cases depends upon surrounding facts
and circumstances.' Therefore, statistical evidence can be
used under the Third Circuit's standard as long as a court be-
lieves that its application is useful and does not preclude ajap-
anese company from exercising its treaty rights.
CONCLUSION
In the future, courts should invoke the Third Circuit's
standard for determining whether a Japanese company violates
Title VII, because this standard avoids the problems created by
the narrow standards suggested by the Second and Fifth Cir-
155. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); see also Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir.
1988).
156. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
157. Id.
158. 882 F.2d 760, 767 (3d Cir. 1989); see Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 338, 340 (1977) (noting importance of surrounding circumstances to
relevance of statistical evidence).
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cuits. The Third Circuit's standard also preserves FCN Treaty
rights. This standard, however, does not settle the question of
how to define unpermitted national origin discrimination. The
factors articulated by the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois and by the Third Circuit are broad enough that
courts will always have the flexibility to go either way on the
issue. Such is the nature of the U.S. judicial system. However,
the appeal of the Third Circuit's definition of national origin
discrimination is that in reconciling the purposes of both the
FCN Treaty and Title VII, courts have the flexibility to deter-
mine whether factors particular to the case tend to prove un-
permitted national origin discrimination. Courts should take
advantage of this flexibility by applying the Third Circuit's def-
inition of unpermitted national origin discrimination rather
than invoking other definitions that limit a court's ability to
make case-by-case determinations.
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